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THE MILITARY JUNTA'S “100-DAY PLAN”: A NARRATIVE OF REFORM, A REALITY OF MILITARY CONSOLIDATION

EDITOR'S NOTE:

The military regime has presented its “100-Day Plan” as a roadmap for peace, stability, economic recovery, public service delivery, education, healthcare, agriculture, transport, and national development. At first glance, these objectives may appear constructive, as every country seeks peace, development, and stability. However, public policy must be judged not by [official declarations](#), but by actions and outcomes. For ASEAN and the international community, the central question is therefore clear: Does the military's conduct on the ground reflect the commitments outlined in its 100-Day Plan?

1 EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THE OPPOSITE

The plan should not be understood as a genuine national recovery programme. Rather, it is a short-term political strategy designed to consolidate military rule following a [widely rejected and illegitimate election](#), while creating diplomatic space for renewed international engagement.

Figure 1: Myanmar Military's 100-Day Plan: From Reform Narrative to Regional Risk



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WHAT THE PLAN CLAIMS VS. WHAT IT DOES

The official narrative says the plan links peace and stability to development and sets 31 July 2026 as the final date for Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People's Defence Forces (PDFs) to join dialogue or return to the legal framework. The same announcement lists quick administrative deliverables, including farm loans, airfield and railway upgrades, mobile stations, rural water systems, school programmes and health measures. But the practical design is coercive. It treats resistance forces as actors to be brought into the military's peace framework and treats People's Defence Forces (PDFs) primarily as actors to be absorbed into the military's legal order. [Key resistance actors rejected the offer](#), and [international reporting](#) described the proposal as a peace-talks deadline rather than an inclusive federal political process.

The deeper logic: military-defined peace

The plan reflects a long-standing military doctrine: the Myanmar military sees itself not only as a defence institution but as the guardian

and political manager of the state. The Myanmar Defense & Security Institute ([MDSI](#)) [paper](#) on military ideology argues that the military has historically recast itself from protecting the state into an institution that administers or dominates the state, and that it treats federalism less as power-sharing than as a pathway to secession and Union disintegration.

This matters because a genuine peace plan would need to address federalism, civilian supremacy, transitional justice, security-sector reform, and inclusive dialogue with the National Unity Government (NUG), Steering Council for Emergence Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union ([SCEF](#)), ethnic resistance organisations (EROs), civil society, women-led networks and affected communities. The 100-Day Plan does not do this. It invites compliance with a military framework only.

Table 1: Official Claims and Likely Functions of the Junta's Normalisation Plan

Official claim	Likely function
Peace talks before 31 July	Pressure EROs/PDFs to enter the military framework
PDFs to enter the legal fold	Depoliticize resistance as a law-and-order problem
Development projects	Signal normal government performance after contested elections
Education, health, water and communications	Deliver selective services in controlled areas
Civilian-style administration	Rebrand military rule without transferring power

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WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE PEOPLE OF MYANMAR

For the people of Myanmar, the 100-Day Plan is not a peace dividend. It is a deadline attached to coercion. It does not protect civilians, open humanitarian space, release political prisoners, end attacks on schools and hospitals, or recognize federal democratic aspirations. The [EU statement](#) at the UN General Assembly said the military's staged elections and nominal civilian rebranding do not confer legitimacy and called for a genuine cessation of violence, humanitarian access and inclusive dialogue.

[Julie Bishop's briefing](#) to the UN General Assembly similarly contrasted the authorities' narrative after the military-administered election with community accounts of continued aerial bombing, denial of services, reduced participation, exclusion of major political parties and polls held during armed conflict. Her briefing also described Myanmar as setting records "for all the wrong reasons," including cybercrime, opium and


methamphetamine, landmine casualties, hunger, displacement and child casualties.

Violence during the 100-day period: NUG MoHR data through 30 June

The NUG Ministry of Human Rights [dataset](#) for 20 April-30 June, an early two third portion of the 100-day period, records 1,045 violations. The largest categories were extrajudicial killings, property destruction, other violations, forced labour, arbitrary arrests and forced displacement. The same dataset records 396 aerial-attack incidents, 1,147 attacks, 600 houses damaged, 22 schools, 9 medical facilities and 30 religious buildings affected; it also records 277 deaths and 431 injuries in the casualty table, and 20 massacre cases with 162 reported victims. buildings affected; it also records 277 deaths and 431 injuries in the casualty table, and 20 massacre cases with 162 reported victims.

People-centred test: Any credible plan must first stop attacks on civilians, open aid access, release political prisoners and engage federal democratic stakeholders. The 100-Day Plan fails this test.

Figure 2: Total Number of Aerial Attacks and Massacres Carried Out by the Military Junta Since the Coup (1 February 2021–30 June 2026)



Source: <https://mohr.nugmyanmar.org/en/aerial-attacks-by-military-junta-data-dashboard/>

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EVIDENCE DASHBOARD: BRUTALITY UNDER THE 100-DAY PLAN

The strongest way to assess the 100-Day Plan is not by the promises it lists, but by what the military did during the same period. The MoHR data show widespread violations across central Myanmar, ethnic states

and coastal regions, with Magway, Sagaing, Mandalay, Tanintharyi, Bago and Chin among the most affected locations by recorded violation count.

Table 2: Regional Distribution of Recorded Violations, Aerial Attacks, and Massacres During the Military Junta's 100-Day Plan, as of 30 June 2026

Regions	Violations	Aerial attacks		Total Number of Massacres
		Incidents	Attacks	
Magway	199	65	241	2
Sagaing	148	97	249	2
Mandalay	144	29	44	3
Tanintharyi	101	25	45	0
Bago	84	32	62	2
Chin	82	66	249	5
Karen	38	16	31	2
Rakhine	77	33	105	1
Kachin	48	8	16	1
Mon	36	11	73	2
Total	957	382	1115	20

Implications

- The plan did not reduce coercion. Violence and aerial attacks continued while the administration promoted peace language.
- Civilian infrastructure was not protected. Schools, medical facilities, homes and religious buildings were recorded as damaged or affected.
- The pattern is nationwide. Recorded violations concentrated in conflict-affected regions but were not confined to one front.
- The peace claim collapses under evidence. A plan that coincides with mass violations functions as a control strategy, not a peace strategy.

5 WHAT IT MEANS FOR ASEAN

For ASEAN, the 100-Day Plan is not a stabilizing opportunity unless it is tied to strict benchmarks. Without benchmarks, it becomes a legitimacy trap: the military stages elections, rebrands itself as a civilian administration, announces a time-bound peace-and-development plan, and uses regional engagement to regain acceptance while violence and repression continue.

The regional risk is wider than Myanmar's battlefield. Julie Bishop described Myanmar as a global epicentre for cybercrime, with industrial-scale scam compounds expanding trafficking networks as far as Africa and targeting victims in the United States, Asia and beyond. The [OHCHR report on online](#) scam operations states that hundreds of thousands of people from the region and beyond have been forcibly engaged in online criminality and face serious human-rights violations, including forced labour, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence and other abuses.


UNODC's 2024 technical policy brief estimates cyber-enabled fraud losses in East and Southeast Asia at US\$18-37 billion in 2023 and warns that criminal groups are expanding into inaccessible and autonomous territories and criminal enclaves, outpacing the capacity of governments to contain them.

The drug economy adds another ASEAN security risk. The [Myanmar Opium Survey 2025](#) reports that opium cultivation increased by 17% to 53,100 hectares in 2025, a ten-year high, and that Myanmar is now the world's leading known source of illicitly produced opium. Conflict, weak rule of law and lack of licit income opportunities are key drivers which is directly related to corrupted Myanmar military institution.

Table 3: ASEAN Spillover Pathways from Myanmar's Crisis

ASEAN risk area	How the 100-Day Plan fails
Legitimacy	Creates a channel for normalization without accountability
Border security	Does not dismantle militia-crime enclaves or scam compounds
Human trafficking	Does not address forced criminality or protection gaps
Illicit drugs	Does not address conflict-driven opium and synthetic drug economies
Humanitarian spillover	Does not ensure aid access, safe return or civilian protection
ASEAN credibility	Risks weakening the Five-Point Consensus by accepting cosmetic change

Figure 3: ASEAN Spillover Pathways from Myanmar's Crisis



6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS: WHAT ASEAN SHOULD DO

ASEAN should not treat the 100-Day Plan as a credible peace process unless it produces verifiable de-escalation. The plan should be evaluated against concrete outcomes: an immediate halt to attacks on civilians, cessation of airstrikes and paramotor/drone attacks, release of political prisoners, unimpeded humanitarian access, and inclusive dialogue with all legitimate stakeholders.

Recommended ASEAN position

- Reject normalization without benchmarks. No high-level political normalization unless the military stops attacks, allows aid access and engages all legitimate stakeholders.
- Treat the plan as a test, not a process. Use measurable indicators: civilian protection, humanitarian access, detainee releases, an end to forced conscription, and inclusive political dialogue.

- Engage the people's representatives and local actors. Formal engagement should include the NUG, SCEF, EAOs, women-led networks, local humanitarian actors and affected communities.
- Scale up cross-border and local humanitarian assistance. Aid modalities should bypass military obstruction and support trusted local and ethnic service providers.
- Address regional crime as a peace-and-security issue. Scam compounds, trafficking, illegal casinos, cryptocurrency laundering and drug production should be treated as part of the Myanmar crisis.
- Coordinate arms, jet fuel and dual-use controls. Prevent flows of weapons, jet fuel, paramotor components, dual-use technologies and surveillance tools that enable civilian attacks.
- Create an ASEAN monitoring mechanism. Track violence, displacement, humanitarian obstruction and cross-border crime using UN, civil society, local and NUG MoHR data.

The 100-Day Plan is neither for the people of Myanmar nor for ASEAN peace and stability. It is a military supremacy plan. It uses development language to claim governance capacity, peace language to pressure resistance actors, and diplomatic language

to seek recognition. If ASEAN engages without strict benchmarks, the likely result is not peace but deeper chaos, further civilian harm and greater regional insecurity.

This statement should be read in the context of ASEAN's own Five-Point Consensus (5PC), which remains the agreed regional framework for Myanmar. As some ASEAN member states consider renewed engagement with the Myanmar military junta, ASEAN must stand firmly on the 5PC and avoid treating meetings, elections, or diplomatic access as political progress in themselves. The junta has had more than five years to implement the commitments it accepted, yet violence against civilians continues, humanitarian access remains restricted, and inclusive political dialogue has not begun. Therefore, any re-engagement should be measured against clear 5PC obligations: cessation of violence, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, engagement with all relevant stakeholders, and progress toward inclusive dialogue. ASEAN should not reward a process that strengthens the source of instability; it should insist on measurable compliance that supports peace, accountability, and a federal democratic future for Myanmar. ■

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ASEAN should not reward a plan that strengthens the source of instability. The region needs civilian protection, inclusive federal dialogue, humanitarian access, accountability and action against transnational criminal economies. ”